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LIMITATIONS IN PROSECUTING CIVIL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS*
Harry H. Shapirot
This article attempts to fill a gap in an understanding of the difficul-
ties encountered by the federal government in conducting a program of
vigorous enforcement of the criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 242.1 Earlier writers have considered the obstacles posed by
the strict requirements of specific intent laid down in the leading case
of Screws v. United States. 2 A number of considerations attendant upon
the Screws requirement, and not heretofore presented in studies on civil
rights enforcement, support a conclusion that the statute has become a
fragile weapon in the armory of the Department of Justice. The
prospect that contemporary racial and other tensions will create addi-
tional incidents of police violation of fourteenth amendment rights places
a heavy burden upon the Civil Rights Division. This 'burden it will
find increasingly difficult to carry under the judicially imposed limita-
tions of the present statute.
Studies of cases arising under section 242 that have so far appeared
have been devoted to variegated analyses of criminal civil rights infrac-
tions and to the constitutional issues related thereto. The present study
complements these by examining the impact of the Screws decision upon
* This paper represents a summary of part of a larger study entitled Federal Enforcement
of the Criminal Civil Rights Statutes. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the
Rutgers University Research Council for its support of this project.
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 579, for biographical data.
1 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. III 1948):
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
2 See especially: Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights, 113-15 (1947); Konvitz, The
Constitution and Civil Rights, chs. 3 & 4 (1947); President's Committee on Civil Rights,
Report-"To Secure These Rights" (1947); Barnett, '"W¢hat is 'State' Action Under the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?", 24 Ore. L. Rev.
227 (1945); Carr, "Screws v. United States: The Georgia Police Brutality Case," 31
Cornell L.Q. 48 (1945); Cohen, "The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights,"
46 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (1946); Clark, "A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights
Statutes," 47 Colum. L. Rev. 175 (1947); Fraenkel, "The Function of the Lower Federal
Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties," 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 132 (1948); Note, "May
the Intent to Violate the Federal Civil Rights Statute be Established by a Presumption?",
40 Geo. LJ. 566 (1952).
3 E.g., "The Civil Rights Section, Its Functions, and Its Statutes," Address by Arthur
B. Caldwell, University of Pennsylvania Civil Rights Seminar, July 16, 1953; Fraenkel,
"The Federal Civil Rights Laws," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 301 (1947); Hale, "Unconstitutional
Acts as Federal Crimes," 60 Harv. L. Rev. 65 (1946); Putzel, "Federal Civil Rights En-
forcement: A Current Appraisal," 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1951); Note "Federal Power to
Prosecute Violence Against Minority Groups," 57 Yale L.J. 855 (1948).
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the statute in terms of its effects upon the Civil Rights Division's prose-
cutional efforts in a particular case study of a civil rights trial-United
States v. Minnick4 Following an exposition, analysis, and critique of
section 242 as a substantive criminal statute, and of the Civil Rights
Division in enforcing the statute, this paper will evaluate the efforts
within the Division, and in Congress, to correct weaknesses in the law.
I.- DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY WEAPON AND THE
CONTROLLING CASE
A bent and blunted sword .. .unintelligible ...neither terrible nor
swift .. .of antiquated uncertainties .. . a leftover from the days of
General Grant.5
In such language one authority has described the Civil Rights Act of
April 9, 1866, expanded somewhat by subsequent amendments, and today
designated as section 242, title 18 of the United States Code.6 In its
present form the statute protects against deprivation of federally secured
rights by those who, acting under color of law, willfully intend such
deprivation. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor offense; convic-
tion results in a one-year jail sentence or a fine not to exceed $1,000.
This is the sole criminal statute upon which the federal government
must rely in executing its program of civil rights enforcement against
official acts involving fourteenth amendment rights.
The constitutionality of section 242 was first challenged in Screws v.
United States.7 Since that decision in 1945, the Screws case has had a
significant effect upon a problem of disturbing proportions in the United
States, i.e., deprivations of fundamental civil rights by police officials,
particularly from persons in the racial minorities.' Although the Court
4 No. 8466-M Cr., S.D. Fla., June 23-26, 1953.
5 Chafee, "Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation,"
27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 519, 526-29 (1959).
6 Congressional debate on the statute is covered in abridged form in 7-8 Great Debates
In American History (Miller ed. 1913). See also Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1908). The history of enforcement during the Reconstruction period is re-
counted in Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice (1937), and Davis, The Federal
Enforcement Acts (1914).
7 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
8 See Intimidation, Reprisal and Violence in the South's Racial Crisis (Jan. 1, 1955-
Jan. 1, 1959) (published jointly by: S.E. Office, Am. Friends Serv. Comm.: Dep't. of Racial
and Cultural Relations, Nat. Council of the Churches of Christ; and Southern Regional
Council). It should be emphasized in this context that incidents similar to those reported
in this report have occurred in other parts of the United States. See: President's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights, Report---"To Secure These Rights" 114-25 (1947); Tabulation of
convictions under Section 242 supplied by Hon. Warren Olney, III, Administrative Officer,
United States Courts, appended to this article; 1955-59 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. Testimony
of Tom C. Clark (then Attorney General of the United States) at "Hearings on H.R. 115
Before House Committee on the Judiciary," 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, at 67-80 (1949),
and "Hearings before the Special Subcommittee to Investigate the Department of Justice
of the House Committee on the Judiciary," 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1954). See also
notes 59, 60, 66 infra.
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affirmed the presence of a line separating lawful arrests from acts viola-
tive of the right of a person to be free from summary punishment beyond
which the police may not step with impunity, the emphasis which it
placed upon the requirement of willful intent, necessitated by the chal-
lenge of vagueness brought against the statute, has drained the section
of its strength. Specific intent, difficult to prove in any case, must be
recognized beyond reasonable doubt by a jury in order to convict. An
explanation of the precise legal meaning of willful intent, as outlined in
the Screws decision, has become an essential part of a judge's charge
to the jury in cases involving section 242. The inadequacy of the jury
charge in the original Screws trial on the point of "willful intent" was
discussed by Mr. Justice Douglas:
The difficulty here is that this question of intent was not submitted
to the jury with the proper instructions .... [I]n view of our construction
of the word 'willfully' the jury should have been further instructed that
• . . [t]o convict it was necessary . . . to find that petitioners had the
purpose to deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right. . . . And in
determining whether that requisite bad purpose was present the jury
would be entitled to consider all the attendant circumstances-the malice
of petitioners, . . its character and duration, the provocation, if any,
and the like.9
It should be noted here that the minority of four, who were opposed
to the constitutionality of section 242, believed that it failed to meet
the standard of definiteness required of criminal statutes. In their view
the statute was restricted to alleged deprivations of federal rights by
state law and did not include breaches made by state officials. Screws,
then, had not committed any act "under color of law." All justices
agreed that Screws' conduct was brutal, deserving of punishment, but
the minority held that it was the responsibility of the State of Georgia
to punish the offender, not that of the federal government.
The Screws case was remanded for retrial. The court's charge to the
jury in the new trial exposed the basic problem---effective prosecution
under section 242:
I want you to be sure to understand that even though they (defendants)
might violate the law so as to commit manslaughter or murder ... under
the laws of the state, it still would not be an offense against the laws of
the United States, unless excessive force was used for the purpose of
depriving the prisoner of the rights guaranteed to him by the Consti-
tution.... If, however,... they used excessive and unnecessary force,...
for the purpose of depriving (victim) . . . of . . . Federally secured or




protected, Federal Constitutional rights, that is the offense charged in ...
the indictment .... 10
In addition to a detailed definition of willful intent, the judge in the
Screws retrial took pains to point out that the question of race was not
at all relevant to a legal determination of the case, thus revealing, in fact
that this was a trial with strong racial overtones.
As to the necessity for finding that the defendants had a "bad pur-
pose" in the fatal beating, Judge Strum made liberal use of the words of
Justice Douglas. The act had to be "willfully committed." Here the
judge went into a full explanation of the meaning of "willful," carefully
following the Supreme Court's definition. It meant,
an evil intent without a justifiable excuse . . . the gravamen of the
offense consists in the evil design ...and it is a question here whether
this was willfully done. So if this incident was no more than an unlawful
homicide, which grew out of a personal . . . animosity . . . then it is
merely an unlawful killing .. .which should be remedied in the State
Courts of Georgia .... Such acts would not constitute a federal offense,
unless you find ... that the defendants had the specific intent of will-
fully depriving the prisoner of the right of being tried by a jury. . . .
If you find that... the defendants ... acted.., without any thought...
to deprive Hall of certain rights ... granted and secured by the Consti-
tution... the defendants would not be guilty of the offense charged....
But in considering the question.., it is not necessary... that the defend-
ants were thinking in terms of the Constitution... because all persons are
charged with the natural ...consequences of their voluntary acts ...
[D]efendants cannot claim that they had no fair warning that their acts
were prohibited by the Federal statute ...those who decide to take the
law into their own hands . ..plainly act to deprive a prisoner of the
trial which due process of law guarantees to him; such a purpose need not
be expressed by the defendants at the time they are doing these things,
but it may be reasonably inferred from all the circumstances attendant
upon the acts. [Emphasis added.] 1
The jury acquitted Screws and those tried with him. Subsequently
they returned to their law enforcement duties.
10 Charge to jury in United States v. Screws, No. 1300 Cr., M.D. Ga., Nov. 1, 1945.
Copy of charge obtained from Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice.
11 Charge of the court, supra note 10, at 18. See Fraenkel, "The Function of the
Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties," 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 132, 142
(1948).
[Tlhe stress on the necessity for willful violation of constitutional rights makes it easy
for a judge unsympathetic to the prosecution to induce a jury to acquit. This is what
actually happened on the retrial ....
A study of the court's charge does not sustain that opinion. While undoubtedly harmful
in its effects upon the Government's case because of the question of "willful" intent, the
charge followed the Screws requirement and the judge emphasized his own concern for
protection under the statute. It should be considered as damaging, not from design, but
from the necessities of the Supreme Court's requirement.
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II. IMPACT OF THE DECISION AND THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE
COURT'S CHARGE
We had a conviction blow in the Screws case.
The uncertainty caused by the Court's interpretation of the statute
has placed great obstacles in the path of the federal prosecutor .... 12
The Supreme Court decision in the Screws case produced both positive
and negative results. On the positive side, the statute was upheld as a
sanction against violation of civil rights by state law enforcement of-
ficials. Thus, forcing confessions by threats, assault or torture; 13 resort-
ing to extortion, false arrest, imprisonment, and neglecting to protect a
victim from mob violence and attempting to avoid criminal prosecution
by divesting oneself of an official capacity while participating in illegal
acts; pursuing and killing a Negro without just cause 15 were en-
compassed within the protections. Violation of these would call the
statute into play. Empowering the federal government to use section 242
against invasion of civil rights by state and local officials, where legal
processes are often influenced by different kinds of prejudice, has become
for many the only means of protection. The federal government could
now intrude into an area normally considered belonging to the states
and their citizens; it could punish conduct not authorized by state law,
but identified with it.
In addition, the Court's affirmation of section 242s constitutionality
assured the survival of the Civil Rights Section. Without such a statute,
this fundamental civil rights protection would have become meaningless.
Since it is unlikely that Congress would have enacted a new law, the
Department of Justice could not have functioned in this area.
The requirements placed upon the government by the Screws decision
were thought by some to be a virtue in disguise in that they permitted
broader jurisdiction over a wider variety of offenses. The failure to in-
clude definite rights, protected and guaranteed under the statute (except-
ing previously defined rights, privileges and immunities secured by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment) would prevent a nar-
row application of the law.
12 Testimony of Attorney General Clark before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. 18, at 74 (1950) (Com-
mittee report entitled "Antilynching and Protection of Civil Rights").
13 Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1942).
14 Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
15 United States v. Trierweiler, 52 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. I1. 1943).
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Finally, the intensive judicial attention given the case had a positive
result. State and local officials -were made aware of the existence of a
federal law under which they could be prosecuted unless they were care-
ful in their application of police powers.
Negatively, the requirements established by the Screws decision, i.e.,
specific intent, willful deprivation of a right to be tried by a court, and
proof that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of his right to
due process have, indeed, proven to be serious obstacles to effective
prosecution. Judges' charges to the jury in cases involving prosecutions
under section 242 do not deviate from the Screws dictum. While the
charges may vary in language, there has developed, since the Screws re-
trial, a consistency and accuracy in presenting the requirements which
leave no doubt of the courts' intention that juries understand their re-
sponsibility in judging acts of defendants in constitutional rather than
criminal terms.16
As noted above, the Court minority in the Screws decision feared that
the statute would be "a dangerous instrument of political intimidation
and coercion in the hands of those so inclined." In this view, the statute
weakens state responsibility in proportion as it augments the power of
the federal government by encouraging federal intrusion. Fear of federal
encroachment is emphasized in those sections of the United States which
may be ignorant of, or opposed to, fourteenth amendment rights in this
context.
Since Screws, many similar cases have been brought in the federal
courts, impelled by inadequate state action, or cynical state inaction,"
and no accommodation has been made with the Screws holding. While
the Screws requirements remain intact, subsequent decisions have modi-
fied and in some cases have mitigated hardships imposed by them.'
In Crews v. United States'8 the fifth circuit held that evidence that a
police officer mistreated a prisoner out of personal malice is not inconsist-
ent with a conlusion that the officer also willfully intended to deprive his
victim of constitutional rights. In Williams v. United States, 9 the first
decision by the Supreme Court since the Screws case, the Court affirmed
16 See, e.g., Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947).
'7 See statement of Attorney General Rogers in the N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1959, p. 1, col.
4, regarding refusal of State of Mississippi to take any action in a lynching case (Mack
Parker) involving removal of a Negro from the Poplarville jail. An attempt to indict under
§ 242 failed.
Is 160 F.2d 746 (Sth Cir. 1947).
19 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
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the holding in Screws that rights under the fourteenth amendment are
protected by section 242, that "color of law" includes misuse of power
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, and that extorting
a confession is a clear violation of section 242.
Lynch v. United States20 filled a gap in the Screws holding by provid-
ing that there could be a denial of a constitutional right resulting from
willful inaction of police. This idea-that a state may violate the four-
teenth amendment by failing to give effective enforcement to its own
laws-represents a possible broadening of the scope of the statute.
Koehler v. United States2 affirmed that an instruction on presumed
intent was within the rationale of the Screws requirement. Even when
the improper action of the police is unauthorized or forbidden by state
law, the statute applies. The defense attorney may, however, raise the
question of whether or not the defendant was thinking in constitutional
terms at the time he resorted to force. The Koehler case, further held
that the right to be free from false imprisonment was within the protec-
tion of the statute. Other rights, including those under the fifth amend-
ment and equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, are
encompassed within section 242. These rights, in addition to those funda-
mental to personal protection, are included within the scope of the
statute, but do not come into play unless physical violence under color
of law is involved.22
20 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951).
21 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 852 (1951).
22 See Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Hunter, 214
F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Gowdy v. United States, 207
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Clark v.
United States, 193 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932 (10th
Cir. 1951); United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1944). Indictments against
prison officials who inflicted summary punishment upon prisoners have been upheld under
§ 242. United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Walker, 216
F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955); United States v. Jones, 207
F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953). Convictions of conspiracy to violate § 242 were upheld in Brown
v. United States, 204 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953) (extortion scheme, willful deprivation of
property rights without due process of law, under color of authority). Section 242 protects
against willful federal, state, and local infringement of other rights, where violent inter-
ference is a factor. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (freedom from unlawful
searches and seizures); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939) (first amendment); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of
speech) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (freedom of press); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (to express and exercise religious beliefs); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (to establish a home); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921) (right to conduct a lawful business) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (to pursue
a lawful calling). Section 242 may be used to punish official interference with rights pro-
tected against infringement by private persons. E.g., In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532
(1895) (the right to inform federal officers concerning federal offenses). The 1959 Civil
Rights Commission Report 19-145 deals with the application of the statute to voting rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1957.
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III. CASE STUDY OF A PROSECUTION UNDER THE STATUTE
United States v. Minnick
23
The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a
single functionary 2 4
The victims in criminal civil rights cases are often "ignorant, friend-
less persons, unaware of their rights, and without means of challenging
those who have violated those rights.' 25 Add to this description the ele-
ments of racial prejudice in a large number of these incidents and the
restrictions imposed by the Screws holding on the Department of Justice,
and the Minnick2M case falls into the category of an archetype criminal
civil rights violation. The values to be derived from a study of this
case flow from noting these features: the aborted attempt at state action;
the nature of the offense for which the victim was being apprehended;
the deliberative, procedural and prosecutive efforts of the Department of
Justice; and the conduct and result of the trial. Too often incidents
of constitutional violation, while of interest and value in exhibiting the
strengths and weaknesses of our judicial processes, overlook the values
which derive from a delineation of the statute in action. In that connec-
tion, Minnick will serve to illustrate the impact of Screws upon the fed-
eral government in its prosecutive effort. This includes the Department
of Justice and the agency which handled the case, the Civil Rights Sec-
tion, the United States Attorney's office, and the court.
The rationale for selecting the Minnick case as illustrative of the major
facets involved in a criminal civil rights prosecution is based upon its
resemblances to Screws and Crews, as to the latter in regard to the
elements of trial by ordeal, summary punishment, and death of the
victim. But unlike Crews, who was convicted and whose conviction was
upheld, Minnick was able to profit from the limitations which the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice felt compelled by the
Screws requirements to impose upon its conduct of the case. The passage
of seven years since the trial in 1953 have, in comparison with other
23 No. 8466-M Cr., S.D. Fla., June 23-26, 1953. Although there were two trials of
officer Minnick, this study is restricted to the prosecution in Miami, Florida. Officer Minnick
was tried in two district courts under two separate indictments charging offenses under
§ 242. They were unrelated incidents. Minnick was first indicted in Washington, D.C., for
an offense under the statute while a member of the Metropolitan Police Department. Al-
though under indictment, he left Washington and went to Homestead, Florida, where he
was appointed a police officer. Five weeks later he committed the offense which forms the
basis for the discussion here. Information was drawn from the files on the case in the
Department of justice, Civil Rights Division, File No. 144-16-79 (District of Columbia
trial).
24 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
25 President's Committee on Civil Rights, Report-"To Secure These Rights" 25 (1947).
28 United States v. Minnick, No. 8466-M Cr., S.D. Fla., June 23-26, 1953.
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cases studied, fixed it in the experience of the Civil Rights Division as a
case which epitomizes the weaknesses of the statute.
The facts of the Florida case27 were briefly as follows: On Christmas
morning 1952, a white woman driving along a higway near Florida
City was forced off the road by a car driven by a "light skinned" Negro.
When the local police received the report, they proFeeded to a migrant
farm labor camp where they questioned several workers and attempted
to arrest one Emmitt Jefferson. Jefferson, refusing to submit to arrest,
got into his car and drove past a police roadblock to his father's house
in nearby Homestead. Arriving immediately behind him, one police
officer began beating Jefferson with a blackjack, at which point Officer
Minnick arrived and, despite pleadings from Jefferson's father, shot
the suspect to death.
Officer Minnick was suspended from his position and arrested on a
first degree murder charge. Shortly thereafter, a Dade County Grand
Jury returned a no bill. The Justice Department was requested to insti-
tute a preliminary investigation for the purpose of developing a complete
picture and determining possible statutory violation. Jurisdiction, with
"willfulness" as the controlling influence, is the criterion for determining
whether or not to initiate prosecution. After the Grand Jury refused to
indict, Minnick was arrested on a Commissioner's warrant.28
The local grand jury situation, which made impossible immediate
presentation, had prompted the Justice Department to file a complaint
with the United States Commissioner. Because of the disappointing ex-
perience in the initial attempt to indict, the Department was doubtful of
success and considered three alternatives:
1. To present the case again to a larger grand jury.
2. To proceed by an information.
3. To present the case to a new grand jury.
The latter alternative was chosen and a federal grand jury subse-
quently did indict Minnick.
The Assistant United States Attorney, Fred Botts, believed the case
to be "utterly indefensible" and "until there is legislative relief, or the
27 The facts in the incident depicted were taken from the files on the case in the De-
partment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, File No. 144-18-253 (hereinafter referred to as
File No. 144-18-253).
2S The United States Attorney expressed opposition to the issuing of a Commissioner's
warrant and prosecution by information. His opinion was that a Commissioner's warrant
would make it necessary for the government to "tip its hand" as to evidence available. But
see Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), in which a conviction resulted
following prosecution upon an information. The United States Attorney pointed out that
an information could still be employed after a failure to indict.
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Supreme Court can be induced to retreat somewhat from the language
it has used . . . the prosecutor has little hope of success." it was the
charge, with its strict insistence upon the presence of "willful intent,"
that inevitably led to acquittal. Mr. Botts had wished to introduce in
the Minnick case certain points for charge which would have helped
to overcome the obvious handicaps to conviction.29 His strategy was to
induce the trial court to
give an instruction as to intent which would be along the lines which are
given and considered proper in other cases-that a person... is presumed
to intend the natural and probable results of his act .... In case of a
conviction under such a charge, there would then be an appeal, and the
court would then be called on to determine whether or not it was error
to give the more favorable charge .... so
However, the Department of Justice, concerned over the narrow vote
by which the Court had upheld section 242 in the Screws case, was
reluctant to challenge that decision. The United States Attorney was
advised that the Department would not recommend relaxation of the rule
that the charge must be phrased in the language of the Screws holding. 1
It was suggested that he request the trial judge to elaborate upon the
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas with regard to "attendant circumstances,"
"reckless disregard,", and the immateriality of the requirement that the
defendant must have been thinking in constitutional terms where the aim
was not to enforce local law but to "deprive a citizen of a right . . .
protected by the Constitution." Since retention of the statute, under any
circumstances, was considered vital, "it is absolutely imperative that
prosecutions be brought only in clear cases and that the requirements of
Screws and Williams be strictly followed."
The problem of Minnick's indictment in Washington was also con-
sidered in the preparation of the case. Since the Washington trial had
not yet occurred, it was recommended that information regarding the
alleged offense be withheld from the Miami jury in order to avoid pos-
sible reversible error.3" One exception to the hearsay rule, dealing with
courses of conduct, probably would not be relevant since it could be
shown as simply another incident similar to the one at issue.
29 Letter from Mr. Botts to the author, July 25, 1958:
I almost begged the court to give this charge . . . which . . . while not literally fol-
lowing the words of the Supreme Court, would have a good chance of being upheld.
. . . But unfortunately, few judges, having the clear language of the Supreme Court
as a pattern . . . will risk changing the language to give the prosecutor a chance even
in a vicious case. Sometimes a fearless judge may be found who will be so devoted to
justice that he will risk a reversal, in the interest of justice, and give this charge.
30 Case No. 144-18-253.
31 Ibid.
32 The Department of justice reminded Mr. Botts of the general rule excluding evidence
of other crimes, e.g., Laughlin v. United States, 92 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
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The trial began on June 23, 1953, before Judge George Whitehurst.
The more than three-hundred pages of testimony taken in the case are
too interrelated for presentation out of context. Judge Whitehurst, in
his charge to the jury, carefully and correctly followed the charge that
had been developed in the Crews 33 case, which in turn had followed the
charge of Judge Strum in the Screws34 retrial. The jury was instructed
that unless they
found Minnick specifically intended to deprive ... Jefferson of his consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights when he shot him . . . they could not con-
vict ... that even if they felt Minnick was guilty of murder it would not
necessarily follow that he had violated the Civil Rights statute.35
The defense counsel was satisfied with the court's charge and, after
comparing it with his own requested points for charge, he concluded that
"the requirements for conviction that the judge constructed from the
Screws holding were fair, and covered the field" so completely that his
requested points were inserted in the records but, with one important
exception, not read."8 The exception:
To convict the Defendant of the charge contained in this indictment, it is
necessary that you first find from the evidence beyond and to the exclusion
of every reasonable doubt that the Defendant took the life of Emmitt
Jefferson with the intention of denying Emmitt Jefferson either or all of
these constitutional rights which have been enumerated. It is not enough
to convict upon this charge that the Defendant may have had a bad
purpose in firing the fatal shot; for example, if you find from the evidence
that the Defendant in carrying out his duties as an officer of the law,
approached the scene . . . and that the Defendant in attempting to
make an arrest . . . may have used more force than was necessary to
effect that arrest, which . . . resulted in the death of Emmitt Jefferson,
this in itself is not enough to convict the Defendant of intentionally
denying Emmitt Jefferson those constitutional rights enumerated in the
indictment.
The jury was out four hours and forty-five minutes, returning once
for a rereading of that portion of the charge relating to "willful" depriva-
tion of rights. The verdict of acquittal was not unexpected by the gov-
ernment despite its belief that it had presented a strong case.
Some comfort may have been intended in a memorandum from the
Department of Justice in Washington to Mr. Botts. The language of the
Department reflects a certain resignation with which it has come to view
its handicaps in prosecuting under Section 242.
33 Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947).
34 United States v. Screws, No. 1300 Cr., M.D. Ga., Nov. 1, 1945.
35 File No. 144-18-253.
36 Telephone conversation with Mr. Robert K. Bell in Miami, Florida, Nov. 30, 1959.
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[I]t may perhaps be found to have been a most fortunate occurrence
since the punishment that can be assessed for murder or manslaughter
under state law is much more appropriate than the one year, $1,000 fine
maximum prescribed under the Civil Rights statutes 7
The jury foreman said that the
general consensus was that Minnick was guilty of manslaughter or second
degree murder . . . and that the state authorities should do something
about prosecuting him. There was no way to get around the instruc-
tions. . . . We would have liked to convict this man, but we could do
nothing else (but acquit) under the Judge's charge.38
Following the acquittal the Justice Department advised Mr. Botts
to provide the State Attorney for Dade County with a transcript of the
testimony, but directed him not to go to the foreman of the Dade County
Grand Jury. So deeply did the United States Attorney feel regarding
the acquittal that he continued to make efforts to have the State of
Florida reopen the case for prosecution. 9
On June 30, the state's attorney announced that in view of the civil
rights trial and statements of jurors who tried the case, he intended to
reopen the case against Minnick to consider prosecution on a murder
charge.40 An offer of "full cooperation and assistance" from the Justice
Department was immediately forthcoming, to redress what it considered
an "apparent miscarriage of justice." A number of jurors who had served
in the federal trial were interrogated by the state's attorney. His con-
clusion was that inasmuch as a state grand jury had, in 1952, returned
a no bill, he would recommend to the present grand jury that no action
be considered. The case was then closed.4
There remained for Minnick another trial-this time for the offense
in Washington. This, too, resulted in acquittal, following the court's
charge, which was true to the prescription in the Screws retriaL4
2
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
Certainly no other agency (CRS) within a period of less than a decade,
has forced a greater change in our constitutional philosophy. The most
revered section of our Constitution, the Bill of Rights, is at least seen
for what it is: a shield fashioned by a democracy for safeguarding
individual freedom against governmental encroachment. Now another
instrument has been fashioned, a sword, for which little or no express
37 File No. 144-18-253.
38 Ibid., statement of juror to United States Attorney Botts, as expressed in letter from
Botts to the author, July 25, 1958.
39 File No. 144-18-253. This is evidenced by a letter from Botts to George A. Brautigam,
State Attorney for Dade County, July 16, 1953.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 File No. 144-16-79, Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div.
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constitutional sanction exists. But it has been fashioned and its use-
fulness decisively indicated. 43
An already overburdened Department of Justice . . . cannot be expected
to devote its energies to supervising local police activities and prosecuting
police officers, except in rare and occasional instances. And the
hostility which such prosecutions have received here (see Screws v. United
States ... ) hardly encourages putting the federal prosecutor on the track
of state officials who take unconstitutional short cuts in enforcing state
laws.44
In accord with the Civil Rights Act of 1957,11 the Civil Rights Section
was detached from the Criminal Division of the Justice Department and
raised to separate division status. Within the new division a Constitu-
tional Rights Unit has cognizance of
all matters and cases involving alleged denial of due process of law under
the 5th or 14th Amendments, and those arising under . . . Sections 241
and 242 . . . which involve an alleged denial of the equal protection of
the laws .... 46
The actual preparation of cases under section 242, as well as the other
statutes within the area of division responsibility, is in the hands of a
Trial Staff, composed of attorneys from the Appeals and Research Sec-
tion and Constitutional Rights Unit. It is they who conduct grand jury
investigations and provide assistance to United States attorneys in both
the presentation of evidence to a federal grand jury and in court proceed-
ings involving the federal government.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson
in the Screws case it was stated that,
The Department of Justice has established a policy of strict self-limitation
with regard to prosecutions under the civil rights acts. When violations of
such statutes are reported, the Department requires that efforts be made
to encourage state officials to take appropriate action under state law.
To assure consistent observance of this policy in the enforcement of the
civil rights statutes, all United States Attorneys have been instructed to
submit cases to the Department for approval before prosecutions or
investigations are instituted. The number of prosecutions which have
been brought under the civil rights statutes is small.47
It is true that the Civil Rights Division has not considered its function
that of a national policing agency. Its operations are held strictly within
43 Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights 210 (1947), referring to the Civil Rights
Section of the Criminal Division.
44 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 152 (1954) (dissent by Douglas J.; see also his
appendix to that opinion at 153).
45 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1958).
46 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 191-93 (1960).
47 325 U.S. 91, 159 (1945).
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a self-limiting area with regard to section 242 because of the tenuous
condition of the statute.
Expectation that the establishment of the Division would result in an
increased number of complaints of offenses, many of which would be
considered violative of section 242, was substantiated following the
Supreme Court decision in the School Segregation Cases and those in-
volving public accommodations. Desegregation procedures primarily
involve state officers. Resistance to court orders, as in Little Rock,
Arkansas, which erupts into "color of law" violence has resulted in
pressure for aggressive action by the Division. Other manifestations of
contemporary civil rights pressures often result in acts of state officials
which may be encompassed within the statute. Emphasis upon an
expanded program of liaison and consultation with law enforcement agen-
cies . ..of States in order to .. .encourage proper state action .. .and
to place State and Federal responsibilities in proper perspective; . . .
the collection of complete factual information on developments in the
field of civil rights, .. .48
and the right to vote laws with their ramifications and manifestations,
should present the Division with challenging and heavy responsibilities.
However, any positive conclusions as to success in these areas would
thus far be contrary to the facts.
Several reasons account for the ineffectiveness of the Division, among
them the hostility with which its functions have been viewed by state
officers49 and some members of Congress,5" the problems involved in
obtaining indictments from sometimes hostile federal grand juries,51 the
48 "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations," 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 191-205 (1959).
49 See criticism by Governors of Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia of FBI for "in-
vading" police powers of states "by investigating alleged brutality against inmates of state
institutions. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1953, p. 1, col. 6.
50 See, for example, "Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2 (1959). Criticism of the
Civil Rights Division was marked throughout much of the testimony, particularly at
pp. 1080-1081. See also 1959 report of the Civil Rights Commission:
Some of the members of the subcommittee (Subcommittee of the Committee on Ap-
propriations, H.R., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 189-194) were apparently not im-
pressed with the record of the Civil Rights Division. A large part of its energies ...
had been' channeled into compiling statistics and ... digesting State election laws
... its legal actions were disappointing in number, nature, and results.
This criticism referred specifically to enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The views
of some members of the Subcommittee were critical also of the Division in regard to
prosecutions under § 242. See particularly pp. 195-218. See also "Hearings before the Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations," 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-09 (1960)
(Congressman John R. Rooney (D) N.Y.:
"This . . .Division ... should have been part of the Criminal Division, rather than
as it is now.... The Criminal Division would have done a better job.")
51 See "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations,"
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1958) and 103 Cong. Rec. 11640-41, 11645-47, 12156-57 (July 26
& Aug. 1, 1957).
Of particular interest in this connection are the Dawson, Georgia, incident and the efforts
1961]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
resistance of many local police departments to the investigatory processes
of the FBI,52 and the reluctance of the FBI to complicate its working
relationships with police departments by arresting officers on complaints.
An additional difficulty results from the fact that, where there are no
regional offices, the Division must rely upon information supplied by
local officials as well as United States attorneys who are local residents
and whose actions and reactions are frequently influenced by local pres-
sures.5 3 Thus, placing state and federal responsibilities in proper per-
spective often means an immobilization which tends to nullify any suc-
cessful federal intervention when no other course is possible. Difficulties
in prosecuting and the low number of convictions when juxtaposed against
the statistics on sentences imposed54 add to the disabilities experienced
by the Division.
The difficulties encountered in the approval of an assistant attorney
general to head the Civil Rights Division is a reflection of the continuing
opposition within the Senate Judiciary Committee to the federal civil
of the Justice Department to obtain indictments under § 242 there, and in the Mack
Parker case in Poplarville, Miss. These failures indicate the difficulties the Justice Depart-
ment faces in attempting to prosecute police officials in some sections of the Deep South.
For the Dawson case see Intimidation, Reprisal, and Violence in the South's Racial Crisis,
supra note 9, at 23-24, Washington Post Times Herald, June 8, 1958, p. 1, col. 3, and N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 1958, p. 72, col. 1. In the Mack Charles Parker lynching the attempt of
the Department of Justice to obtain a federal indictment under § 242 failed. Federal in-
tervention was attempted after a state grand jury had disregarded evidence contained in
a file assembled by the FBI and presented to the governor of the state and presumably
other state officers as well as the grand jury.
52 See "Hearings before the Special Subcommittee to Investigate the Department of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary," 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., on H. Res. 50, ser.
2, at 1-294 (1953).
53 The Civil Rights Division has developed a working liaison on cases involving civil
rights with New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts under which authorities are noti-
fied of substantial complaints of violations and the practices are then corrected. This is
done where "police practices are really violations of due process of law but . . . cannot
be prosecuted for one reason or another. . . ." "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 202 (1959). These are the only
states in which there is a regular working liaison on such cases, but
in several Southern States a situation may arise involving a deprivation of constitutional
rights, . . . and where the State authorities indicated they were taking action in good
faith, the Civil Rights Division cooperated either by exchange of information, or by
deferring to their action.
Id. at 213. The danger is that if state action proves inadequate in terms "of legal remedy
or prevention, the federal government, if it is to move, must do so under a handicap.
The FBI has for several years conducted special civil rights schools resulting from the
emphasis placed upon the law enforcement officer's "role as a guardian of individual rights
and privileges . . . [and] to assist in better equipping police to meet this critical obliga-
tion. . . ." 1957 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 192.
54 See Appendix III for analysis of sentences under § 242. A recent case, United States
v. Dunn, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Fla. 19-), is of interest in that the court granted a directed
verdict of acquittal on the § 242 indictments of fourteen former prison guards, accused
of torturing prisoners at Raiford (Fla.) State Prison. The judge dismissed on two
grounds: the doctrine of the Screws holding, and failure of the Government to submit
sufficient proof of intent to warrant continuing the case to a jury verdict. The judge
also dismissed the § 241 conspiracy charges. Information obtained from Civil Rights
Division, August 9, 1960.
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rights function.5 Certainly such opposition has not invigorated the Divi-
sion. The result has been disappointing in terms of leadership and results.
The Division, with its manifold statutory responsibilities,56 has been
functioning with fewer attorneys than many other federal bureaus and
agencies of lesser importance.
These difficulties must cause feelings of frustration in the Division
as it contemplates its problems in and out of court. Nevertheless, it
continues to act upon complaints, to investigate, and, where indictments
have been obtained, to prosecute. It also has embarked "on a large
scale due process type of enforcement . . . to move against organized
denial of citizen's rights. 57 The Division has been criticized for not
moving to prosecute by an information where indictments have not been
forthcoming. It might have attempted such prosecution in the Dawson
and Poplarville cases. Such action, even if it resulted in acquittals,
might have had a salutary effect upon those communities, their police,
the states concerned-Georgia and Mississippi-and the Civil Rights
Division. Prosecution, despite an adverse decision, would have indicated
a determination, courageously carried out, to enforce the statute. At
the same time, failure to convict in two such highly publicized incidents
might have stimulated Congress into taking some action on the statute.
These were opportunities lost. They have not yet been retrieved. Reflec-
tions upon the administration of justice in the United States have led the
Commission on Civil Rights to enter into a study of this field.59
55 W. Wilson White was appointed by President Eisenhower to be Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Civil Rights Division, on December 9, 1957. The appointment remained in the Senate
judiciary Committee until action was taken on August 18, 1958. The confirmation was
delayed despite the fact that Mr. White had previously been confirmed for a position of
similar rank-Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. Following Mr. White's
resignation on Sept. 28, 1959, a delay of four months ensued until a successor, Harold R.
Tyler, Jr. was nominated on January 26, 1960. Mr. Tyler served in as an interim appoint-
ment pending action by the Senate Judiciary Committee. He was finally given a hearing
on June 29. Three of the five members of the subcommittee are Southern Democrats. The
two Republican members gave Mr. Tyler "little support" during the hearings. N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1960, p. 19, col. 1. He was finally approved on August 20 and served until the
Democratic Administration took office in January 1961.
Mr. Burke Marshall, nominated by President Kennedy on February 2, was confirmed by
the Senate on March 28. Thus, in the less than four years of its existence as a Division,
there have been three assistant attorneys general and one acting assistant attorney general.
The first, Mr. White, waited more than eight months for Senate approval, and served for
one year. The second, Mr. Tyler, served but for months following a wait of eight months
for approval. (Mr. Ryan had acted as assistant attorney general preceding Mr. Tyler's
nomination, and has also resigned from the Division.) These officials were Republicans.
Mr. Marshall, a Democrat, waited almost two months for approval by a Democratically
controlled Senate judiciary Committee. These obstructive delays may be considered to be
related to the politics of civil rights activity in the Senate judiciary Committee. It is not
calculated to enhance the operational vigor of the Civil Rights Division.
56 See Appendix I concerning jurisdiction of Civil Rights Division.
57 See statement of prosecutions under way, and pending, in "Hearings," supra note 53 at
200.
58 See note 51 supra.
59 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1959, p. 28, col. 1.
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The basic test of the administration of justice is not the number of
offenders convicted. Rather it is in the diligence, the vigor, and the zeal
with which the innocent are protected, the offenders prosecuted. It -is
by this standard that we must judge the efforts of the Civil Rights Divi-
sion. The "sword" is not sharp. Initially dull, it has become further
blunted by the inhibitions placed upon it by the Screws holding and by
self-imposed limitations of function. Congressional inaction in this area
and the negative approach to civil rights protections in some states
have served only to compound the limitations.
This critique of the Division must be evaluated against the continuing
efforts of the professional staff to move ahead with its manifold responsi-
bilities. A measurable decrease in police brutality and kindred-practices
has been claimed as a positive result of federal action, as a deterrent at
times, and as a punitive weapon where mediation or education do not
succeed. Awareness of the statute and the undesirability of federal
prosecution, with the possibility of conviction for a federal crime, are
undoubtedly of value. Convictions, such as Crews, Williams, Catlette,
and others, evidence the many successes 6 which have attended the efforts
of the old Civil Rights Section from 1939 to 1957. Its conscientious and
vigorous effort in Minnick, while a failure if acquittal is to be interpreted
as failure, must have had effects of a deterring nature. They are the
positive factors in the evaluation.
The goal of the Division's efforts is to:
vindicate the constitutionally protected rights of individuals . . . to give
meaning to the law by giving evidence of punitive efforts . . . the purpose
of civil rights prosecutions is remedial rather than punitive .... 61
It is in this context that the Division's efforts should be evaluated.
V. PROPOSED AMENDATORY LEGISLATION
If Congress desires to give the act wider scope, it may find ways of
doing so.62
[Section 242] can never be a very strong reed for a positive program
of federal protection of civil rights, and the Court will never be free from
difficulties in interpreting it. Congressional adoption of new legislation is
desperately needed.6 3
In recent years, numerous bills on the subject of civil rights have
been introduced in Congress. Several of these have sought to remedy the
60 See notes 14 (Catlette), 16 (Crews) and 19 (Williams) supra.
61 "Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights," Address by Arthur B. Caldwell, University of
Pennsylvania Civil Rights Seminar, July 16, 1953.
62 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945) (Douglas, J.).
63 Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court 152 (1958).
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defects in section 242 as evidenced in the effects of the Screws decision.
A study of the deficiencies in the statute was made in the Civil Rights
Section as part of the preparatory work in, drafting a proposed new civil
rights act in 1956. Attorneys in the section drafted amendments to the
existing statute, which would have augmented the protective coverage of
rights and changed an offense against section 242 from a misdemeanor
to a felony, increasing the penalties where "wrongful conduct resulted in
the maiming or death of the person . . ." to "a fine. of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not-more than twenty years, or both." '64
A new section 245 would enumerate the specific rights, privileges, and
immunities.6 5
Some attorneys in the Department of Justice believed that the proposed
sections 242 and 245 would not provide an adequate solution to the
problem. Both legal and political considerations dictated the decision of
officials in the Department not to present the proposal to Congress.6
Such a statute would have gone beyond the proposals introduced by
members of Congress at a time when the Administration was primarily
interested in obtaining congressional approval of a right to vote law.
Legally, the Department felt that it would have been an impossible task
to draft a law precise enough to meet the requirements of a criminal
statute and yet broad enough to include the variety of deprivations of
fourteenth amendment rights possible. Coverage of all the means or
64 Draft drawn by Civil Rights Section, Department of Justice, March 2, 1956, entitled
"A Bill to Amend Chapter 13 of Title 18, United States Code, Relating to Civil Rights, and
to Otherwise Strengthen the Civil Rights Statutes."
65 These rights, privileges and immunities are:
1. The right to vote as protected by the Constitution and federal laws;
2. The right to petition the Federal Government for redress of grievances;
3. The right to inform the Federal Government of a violation of federal law;
4. The right to the free exercise of the rights, privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship;
5. The right to be immune from erections of fines or deprivations of property without
due process of law;
6. The right to be immune from punishment for crime or alleged criminal offenses
except after a fair trial and upon conviction and sentence pursuant to due process of
law;
7. The right to be immune from physical violence or mental torture applied to exact
testimony, to compel confession of crime or alleged offenses, or to extort any information;
8. The right to be free of illegal restraints of the person;
9. The right to protection of person and property without discrimination by reason of
race, color, religion, or national origin;
10. The right not to be subjected to illegal summary punishment;
11. The right not to be indicted by a grand jury from which prospective jurors were
systematically excluded because of race... , and the right to be tried by a petit jury
from which prospective jurors have not been excluded because of race . . . ;
14. The right not to be deprived by the willful action or inaction of any person of
any other right which is made or which shall have been made specific by the Constitu-
tion, by the laws of the United States, or by decisions of the courts interpreting such
Constitution or laws.
66 Information obtained in interviews with the draftsmen of the proposed statute.
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methods that could conceivably be used to accomplish denial of a "right"
would undoubtedly have appalled some members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Attorney General Brownell decided that although the present
statute had defects, amendment "would be . . . extraordinarily compli-
cated" and "was not necessary" at the time.67 To codify every federally
protected right, in addition to its impracticability, would make the statute
rigidly confining, and would arouse and deepen further the fears of the
states concerning a misuse of federal power, particularly if prosecutions
under such a new statute were to increase markedly.
The provisions inserted in congressional bills designed to remove the
difficulties imposed by the Screws requirement on "willfulness" have
been similar to those proposed by the Civil Rights Section in 1956. The
most recent bill to amend section 242 was introduced by Senator
Humphrey and others in the last session of Congress. 8 In addition to
providing for increased penalties where death or maiming result, proposed
section 242-A enumerates certain "rights, privileges, and immunities" of
inhabitants, including, but not limited to, a number listed in the Civil
Rights Section proposed statute. Senator Humphrey's bill is similar in
almost all respects to those introduced in the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives since the McGrath proposal in the 81st Congress. This bill
was not acted on by the Judiciary Committee:
[M]embers of the Committee who are unsympathetic to civil rights
legislation have balked any and all attempts to get any civil rights bills
out of the Committee and reported to the Senate . . . we simply do not
have the votes to put through a strong civil rights measure this year.69
Such bills as the two outlined above would help make the statute more
meaningful in terms of rights protected and seriousness of the violations.
They would help remedy the "vagueness" criticism voiced by the minority
opinions in Screws, Crews, Williams, andl Koehler. "Deprivation of rights,
privileges and immunities" would be given specificity. The statute would
provide for procedures applicable to a felony charge which would erase
that flexibility in prosecution by information which has been considered
the saving grace of the Screws requirement. However, this latter, with
the exception of Catlette, has been of little value since its use has been
rare. Making the offense a felony may make it more difficult to indict
and convict but would add greatly to the potential hazard faced by a
violator and might prove a greater deterrent than the present misde-
67 Statement by the Attorney General on Civil Rights legislation before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 1956. Release, Department of Justice.
68 Bill S. 2003 introduced in the Senate May 19, 1959.




meanor statute. Some attorneys in the Division think that to view the
felony offense as a deterrent and punishment is to oversimplify. In
their view indictment and conviction, even under a misdemeanor, are
the more important considerations. However, where maiming or death
result, it is shocking to think of a civil rights criminal statute in terms
of a misdemeanor.
A Supreme Court decision upholding "constructive intent" would of
course greatly strengthen section 242. In addition, proposals in Congress
to add civil remedies would perhaps be exposed to less hardship in the
House and Senate Judiciary committees than have the criminal penal-
ties. 70 In this context the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape7 1 involv-
ing the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is of immediate interest
and possible future significance since it upheld the right of injured
parties to sue police officers for damages where their constitutional rights
were violated. Of particular interest, too, is that there was but one dis-
senter-Justice Frankfurter.
The Kennedy Administration has not yet given an indication of its
thinking in this area of civil rights. Voting, housing, and education, as
civil rights matters requiring Administration and congressional con-
sideration, have had primacy thus far. But protection from physical
violence at the hands of police and other officials remains a nagging,
persistent problem, not likely to be soon resolved under present statutory
protections. It thus devolves upon the new Attorney General to bring
into the Civil Rights Division the kind of leadership, intelligence and
dedication on the higher levels that it has not given evidence of possessing
since it became a Division in December 1957. Unrelenting litigation
where it has jurisdiction should be the policy. This will require both a
strong, daring assistant attorney general, and energetic and dedicated
deputies. The President, assuming that responsibility which is his alone,
must bring the great prestige of his office to bear directly on this situation.
CONCLUSION
Prosecution under section 242 is a delicate and difficult task. When
a state fails or refuses to fulfill its responsibilities for the protection of
civil rights, the intervention of the federal government is required to
vindicate those rights. Screws has' placed a burden upon the Civil Rights
Division which, added to its self-imposed functional limitations in this
area, has made successful prosecution a constant problem. If the pros-
70 See "Hearings on S. 508 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1957).
71 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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pects for future prosecution continue to suffer from these cautionary in-
hibitions, the Civil Rights Division will have lost the opportunity to
realize the goals for which it was established.
A more sharply drawn federal statute, particularizing the rights
protected and providing meaningful penalties in terms of the rights
violated, would sharpen significantly the prosecutive tool. What was
considered by the minority in Screws to be a "shapeless and all embrac-
ing statute" would then become specific and clarified. Despite the fears
of a few, the statute has not become a "dangerous instrument of political
intimidation and coercion," except to those averse to federal intervention
on any terms other than their own. More concern should be given to the
"debilitation of local responsibility" of which civil rights violations are
but a single, albeit, dangerous manifestation.
Testing the concept of "constructive intent" in the courts would enable
the Division to overcome the difficulty imposed by the Screws require-
ment as seen in Minnick. This would require a liberalization of the
court's charge which would clarify permissible behavior of police officers
under the statute. It would then relate "bad purpose" to "constitutional
deprivation."
The strongest possible statute must perforce be limited in application
where the climate of enforcement is at best without strength, and at
worst negative or neutral. There must be a Civil Rights Division with
leadership, direction, and dedication. It will require public recognition,
translated into action by the President and the Attorney General, that
this is indeed a function of national importance, meriting Congressional
and Administrative support. In the final analysis section 242 was enacted
to provide protection of all inhabitants (although directed toward the
Negro initially) from "under color of law" deprivations of fourteenth





STATISTICAL DATA UNDER SECTION 242, FEBRUARY 10, 1960
Prepared by Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
Cases
Submitted
Complaints Complaints to No True Indictments
Received Investigated Grand Jury Bills Returned
Jan.-June, 1958 584 317 2 2
July-Dec., 1958 643 167 12 9 3
Jan.-June, 1959 612 213 9 5 17*
July-Dec., 1959 591 211 4 1 25**
Disposition of Cases in Court
Acquittals Convictions Dismissals
Jan.-June, 1958 1 1 1
July-Dec., 1958 3
Jan.-June, 1959 2 1
July-Dec., 1959 1 1 1
* 14 of these indictments were returned in a single grand jury investigation.
** 23 of these indictments were returned in a single grand jury investigation.
APPENDIX II
DEFENDANTS CONVICTED AFTER TtIAL. OR ON PLEA, AND SENTENCED FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SEcTION 242 SECTION 371 (CONSPnAcY) 3n ALr U. S. DISTRICT COURTS DURING FISCAL
YEARS 1954 THROUGH 1959
Administrative Office U. S. Courts, Washington, D. C., March 1960
District
and Docket Sentence Imposed by the
Fiscal Year Number U. S. District Court
1954
Alabama, N. 1363 Fine $275
Mississippi, S. 2295 12 months and fine $500, suspended,
probation 15 months
Florida, N. 999 1 year and fine $500, imprisonment
suspended, probation 1 year
Texas, N. 9348 6 months, $500 fine
Texas, S. 5754 Fine $100
Kentucky, E. 9951 Fine $1,000
1955
Alabama, N. 1338 Fine $250 to stand committed as of
July 15, 1955 and 6 months, sus-
pended
Texas, E. 5096 Fine $500 to stand committed in
default of payment
1956
Texas, W. 488 4 months-suspended
4 months--probation without super-
vision
Missouri, E. 28285 Fine $100 each counts 1 and 2, to
stand committed
Idaho 2998 Fine $150 and 30 days each of
counts 1 and 2. Imprisonment
suspended and defendant to have
6 months to pay fines.
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Counts 1 and 2, 6 months suspended,
1 year probation, conc. Fine $200
count 1
Count 2, 6 months imprisonment
Fine $500
6 months suspended, 5 years pro-
bation
Probation 1 year, fine $500
Counts 1 and 2, 1 year conc. 6
months
Count 1 under § 371, 12 months
and fine $1,000. Imprisonment
and fine suspended, 3 years pro-
bation. Count 2 under § 242,
jury not guilty
6 months suspended, 5 years pro-
bation, fine $1,000
Probation 2 years, fine $250
